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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PARCELS 
TO THE HOLDENS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The elements of a boundary by acquiescence claim are not in dispute: (1) 
occupation to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for at least 20 years; (4) by adjoining 
landowners. The Holdens do not dispute that boundary by acquiescence is an affirmative 
defense, and that it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. (See Brief of 
Appellants at 20). 
A. Acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
As discussed at length in the Aults5 opening brief, the Holdens did not, and cannot, 
establish the second element of their defense, acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
The Holdens acknowledge that the fence in question was not erected as a boundary (Brief 
of Appellees at 19), but argue that "through their indolence, the Aults acquiesced to the 
fence as a boundary line. The Holdens possessed the property for almost thirty years and 
even built structures on the property in the 1980's, yet the Aults did nothing/' (Id. at 20-
21). 
The Aults have cited (and the Holdens have not refuted) case law observing that 
indolence occurs only when a landowner has reason to know that a claim is or may be 
asserted. (See Brief of Appellants at 25-28). The Holdens suggest, however, that the 
mere existence of a fence anywhere other than precisely on a boundary line automatically 
places landowners on notice of an adverse claim by neighbors on the other side of the 
1 
fence. (Brief of Appellees at 29). This contention would, in effect, eliminate the 
requirement of acquiescence in a fence or monument as a boundary, and instead require 
acquiesce only in a fence itself, contrary to half a century of judicial pronouncements. 
{See Brief of Appellants at 21-23, and cases cited). 
In the court below, there simply was no evidence that the Aults acquiesced in the 
fence as a boundary, and the doctrine is inapplicable. The same conclusion is reached 
under the reasoning of Wilkinson Family Farm v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229-232 (Utah App. 
1999), which held that "parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, 
establish a boundary line by acquiescence." {See Brief of Appellants at 23-25).] 
The Holdens' argument that Wilkinson is inconsistent with Staker v. Ainsworth, 
785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), errs in its assumption that consideration of actual knowledge 
essentially reintroduces the element of objective uncertainty into the analysis. As this 
Court explained in Staker, the short-lived "objective uncertainty" element could only be 
satisfied with a narrow, unworkable type of proof. A claimant had to produce "some 
objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available 
survey information (or other technique by which record title information was located on 
the ground) that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, from being 
reasonably certain about the true location. By the same token, a claimant cannot assert 
Although a holding that mutual knowledge of the true boundary precludes application of 
the doctrine would entitle the Aults to judgment as a matter of law, it is not necessary to 
reach the issue in this case because the parties' knowledge was coupled with affirmative 
acts by the Holdens, including their verbal acknowledgements of the boundary and offers 
to exchange property. 
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boundary by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in title had reason to know the true 
location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence." Id. at 421, quoting Halladay 
v. Guff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). If ancient surveys had disappeared, or landowners 
were deceased, a claim might fail as a matter of law. Id. 
In rejecting the additional element, this Court recognized the difficulty of 
satisfying that high burden of proof. The Court noted that, to satisfy Halladay, "there 
must have been a particular form of dispute. The dispute may not be proved by evidence 
of mere differences of opinion or by a mere lack of actual knowledge of the true location 
of the boundary." Id. (emphasis added). 
As the Court of Appeals recognized in Wilkinson, this Court's recognition of the 
impracticalities caused by Halladay's restrictive burden in no way eliminated the 
significance of actual knowledge. {See Brief of Appellants at 25). Indeed, deeming 
actual knowledge by both parties entirely irrelevant would seem to defeat the purpose of 
the doctrine, which is to resolve boundary disputes. 
In any event, the Holdens are precluded as a matter of law from claiming 
acquiescence, because they occupied the Ault farm pursuant to lease and management 
agreements. The Holdens now claim for the first time that the management agreements 
they had with the Aults "in reality" only covered certain portions of the farm and, 
conveniently, not the portions of the farm in dispute. "[T]here are no credible facts which 
support that any lease existed for the disputed property," the Holdens state, ignoring the 
Aults' record citations - which consist entirely of the Holdens' Verified Answer, Mr. 
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Holden's affidavit, and Mr. Holden's deposition testimony. (See Brief of Appellants at 
12). For example: 
• The Complaint alleged: "[The Holdens] leased the Ault Property from 
approximately 1972 through 1977 and again from approximately 1982 to 1977. . . . At 
various times during the time the Aults have owned the property in question, the Holdens 
have unlawfully trespassed on said property by, among other things, building structures 
on the Ault property, storing personal property on the Ault property without permission, 
and illegally entering said property." (R. 6 ^  9, R. 4 ^ 29). 
The Holdens responded in their Verified Answer: " Admit so much of paragraph 9 
as alleges that Darrell C. Holden leased property from Leo Ault from approximately 1972 
through 1977, but deny the balance of said paragraph. Further answering paragraph 9, 
Holden has managed property allegedly owned by Leo H. Ault, as an agent for Ault, who 
is an absentee landowner residing in Utah County, at various times subsequent to 1977, 
but not pursuant to lease thereto." (R. 19 U 7) (emphasis added). 
• In an affidavit, Mr. Holden repeated the foregoing statement, and added: 
"Affiant did not trespass on the property allegedly owned by Ault, and could not do so 
because of said lease, acknowledged in the Complaint, and management agreements." 
(R. 137 K 8, R. 392 ^ 8) (emphasis added). 
• In his deposition, Mr. Holden testified that he leased "the farm," "the whole 
place," which encompassed the entire "20-something acres" of the Aults' property 
(excluding the house itself). (R. 689 line 25 - R. 684 line 9). Holden testified that the 
written lease terminated in 1977, and that he then had use of the property "every year 
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from 1982 to 1997" through a verbal agreement in which "he [Ault] asked me to manage 
and take care of his place." (R. 685 line 10 - R. 684 line 25). 
Nowhere in the record below was there any suggestion by the Holdens that their 
lease and management agreements encompassed anything but the entire Ault farm, which 
would include the areas in dispute. Indeed, the Holdens expressly relied upon those 
agreements to disclaim liability for trespass on the disputed property. In connection with 
their motion below, the Holdens wrote, "The trespass claim in the Fourth Cause of Action 
is totally without factual basis. Ault has alleged that Holden was his lessee, and Holden 
agrees that he was lessee during part of the period alleged and manager of the Ault 
property during other periods. Holden could not, therefore, be a 'trespasser,' and the 
Court can so conclude as a matter of law." (R. 426) (emphasis added). 
The uncontroverted record is that the Holdens occupied or had permission to use 
the Auks' farm from 1972 through 1977, and again from 1982 through 1997, by virtue of 
lease and management agreements entered into with the Aults. The Holdens do not 
dispute the authority, cited in Aults' opening brief, that such permissive use cannot be 
deemed acquiescence. (Brief of Appellants at 27-29). 
B. For at least 20 years. 
In their brief, the Holdens apparently do not contest the proposition that periods of 
time during which they occupied the Aults' property by virtue of a lease or management 
agreement cannot count toward the 20-year minimum. Rather, they merely restate their 
new (and unsupported) contention that the lease and management agreements 
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encompassed portions of the Aults' farm other than the disputed areas, which has been 
addressed above. 
Significantly, the Holdens offer no response to the point that, if Judge Young's 
ruling is correct that the Aults' alleged acquiescence began in 1978, the 20 years cannot 
be met regardless of the lease/management agreements. It is undisputed that the Aults 
ordered the Holdens off their property in 1997 (see Brief of Appellants at 13) — 19 years 
from the commencement date found by the trial court. 
The Aults further submit that the period of (alleged) acquiescence recommences 
with each conversation between Mr. Ault and Mr. Holden in which the latter 
acknowledged the correct boundary. There is no Utah case law holding that a landowner 
must take physical, rather than verbal, action to restart the clock. 
The basic principle of this case is that boundary by acquiescence was never 
intended to reward a party for misleading his neighbor. The Holdens consistently 
acknowledged over the years that the property did not belong to them. They offered to 
trade for it. They entered into lease and management agreements for the whole Ault farm, 
which included the disputed property. They signed a deed which defined their north line 
as the Aults' south line. They had surveys which showed the true boundary. 
The facts are uncontroverted, and demonstrate the inappropriateness of invoking 
boundary by acquiescence principles in this case. Penalizing the Aults for believing the 
Holdens' representations would further no public policy, and would serve only to foster — 
indeed, require -- distrust between landowners, who could no longer safely allow the use 
of their property in reliance upon their neighbor's word. 
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II. THE HOLDENS CANNOT CLAIM TITLE TO THE 
DISPUTED PROPERTY MERELY BECAUSE THE AULTS' 
DEED DOES NOT CLOSE, OR BECAUSE OF THE 
HOLDENS' ALLEGED "POSSESSORY" RIGHTS. 
A. The Ault deed's failure to close is immaterial. 
The Holdens continue to take the rather disconcerting position that, even if they 
have no legitimate claim to the disputed property otherwise, they are still entitled to have 
ownership transferred to them because the Auks' deed fails to close, even if the failure is 
in a completely different location. (The area which fails to close is in the northwest 
corner of the Ault property, whereas the strip is on the south side. See Jensen Survey, 
Appellants' Addendum Exhibit 7). 
As an initial matter, a potentially misleading statement in the Holdens' brief should 
be clarified. The brief states that, by failing to close, the Ault deed describes nothing at 
all, "and certainly nothing adverse to or inconsistent with the Holdens' prior recorded 
title." (Brief of Appellees at 23). From that language, it might be inferred that the 
Holdens' title somehow overlaps with or includes the disputed portion of the Ault 
property. It is, however, undisputed that the Holdens' deed does not encompass the 
disputed property and, in fact, that their deed expressly defines their northern boundary as 
"the South line of the A. M. Ross and C. M. Plant property" (which the Holdens 
acknowledge is the Ault property). The Holdens have never claimed that the terms of 
their deed describe the disputed property; rather, they claim ownership "solely by virtue 
of long standing possession independent of record title." (R. 107). 
7 
With that clarification noted, the fallacy of the Holdens' argument becomes 
apparent. Parties who have no claim to a piece of property, either through record title or 
boundary by acquiescence (or adverse possession), cannot simply lay claim to another's 
property if they happen to find a failure to close in the other's deed. The Holdens cite no 
authority from Utah or anywhere else for the remarkable proposition that mere failure to 
close anywhere in a deed suddenly renders the landowner's property up for grabs. 
Because of that principle, the Holdens' contention that the failure to close renders 
the Aults' deed imprecise is immaterial, but is nonetheless in error. The Holdens rely 
primarily upon Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 193, 367 P.2d 193 (1962), and Drazich v. 
Lasson, 964 P.2d 324 (Utah 1998), but neglect to address the obvious differences in those 
cases pointed out in appellants' opening brief. For example, the parties in Drazich had 
competing deeds with overlapping descriptions, and used as a critical marker a railroad 
track which could no longer be located. Obviously, those circumstances rendered the 
boundaries incapable of being determined with precision. Similarly, the deed in Howard 
was incomprehensible, even to the point of purporting to convey only about half the 
acreage that was actually involved. 
The Holdens downplay Howard's discussion of Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 
P.2d 132 (1951), and this Court's recognition in Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 
(Utah 1976), that a deed that fails to close nonetheless may be sufficiently precise if 
reasonable inferences can be drawn, such as from the words "to the place of beginning." 
2
 In their brief, the Holdens seek to recharacterize the Aults' argument into a claim of 
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See Losee, 235 P.2d at 137. As described more fully in appellants' opening brief, the 
intent of the Ault deed is clear from its language. (Brief of Appellants at 33-34). 
B. The "race to the registry" is irrelevant when two deeds do not conflict. 
The Holdens continue to make much of the fact that their deed was recorded in 
1973, whereas the Aults' deed was recorded in 1974 . Acknowledging that recording 
dates of the deeds is material only "as to any conflict between the two," the Holdens then 
fail to identify any conflict between the two. 
Instead, the Holdens simply allege that "the South line of the Plant property" 
referred to in their deed is not really the line, but the fence. The Holdens offer no citation 
for that proposition, and in fact make what can only be characterized as a 
misrepresentation, stating: "The pleadings establish that . . . for more than sixty-nine 
years according to the Pehrson sworn statement (R. 396), the north boundary of the Plant 
property was the boundary fence." (Brief of Appellees at 28). As pointed out in 
appellants' opening brief, the statement of Mr. Pehrson said nothing more than that a 
mutual mistake. As should be evident from their discussion of Losee and Colman, 
however, the Aults need not claim mutual mistake because the deed can be construed with 
reasonable precision, taking into account its terms "and reasonable inferences therefrom." 
Colman, 556 P.2d at 505. The Holdens then complain that the Aults seek to "construe" 
the deed "to close." Again, the Holdens seem to miss the Aults' point, which is that 
failure to close is irrelevant when a deed, including language "to the place of beginning" 
and other factors, is nonetheless sufficiently precise. 
It appears that a 1975 recordation date was originally injected into the underlying 
litigation in error and then perpetrated, but the correct date is August 22, 1974. A copy of 
the Ault deed with the recorder's stamp is at R. 87. 
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fence had existed, not that it was the boundary and, in fact, Mr. Pehrson testified that he 
had "no knowledge whatsoever" where the boundary line was. (R. 251, R. 467). The 
mere existence of a fence, which the Holdens acknowledge was not erected as a 
boundary, does not support the contention that "the Holden deed describes the [disputed] 
property." 
III. FACT ISSUES EXISTED WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION. 
The Holdens acknowledge that the Auks' complaint contained causes of action for 
unjust enrichment and conversion arising out of the Holdens' unauthorized use of the 
Aults' water rights and pipe. As noted in appellants' initial brief, the only argument 
raised by the Holdens in the court below against those claims was that they could not be 
maintained because water belongs to the sovereign, and the pipe was capable of being 
retrieved. {See Brief of Appellants at 39-42). 
On appeal, the Holdens appear to have abandoned those contentions, instead 
arguing for the first time that "the factual basis for these claims is very weak," and that 
the Aults never undertook discovery to establish the claims. {Id. at 31) Of course, the 
Aults did not need to undertake discovery; their own eyewitness testimony at trial would 
have been more than sufficient. In any event, though, the Holdens cannot now raise for 
the first time a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency, particularly when they adduced no 
evidence under U.R.Civ.P 56 and the lower court made no determinations. 
The Holdens also argue that the Aults' claims for conversion and unjust 
enrichment of pipe were somehow subsumed in the boundary question. The claims are 
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factually and legally distinct. A dispute over personal property is wholly different from a 
dispute over real property, and the trial court erred in summarily dismissing those claims. 
Additionally, the Aults' trespass claim would encompass conduct occurring after the 
Holdens were ordered off the property in 1997. (R. 4). Unless the Holdens are awarded 
the disputed property, the Aults' trespass claim would remain viable. 
IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS 
AGAINST THE AULTS, BECAUSE THEIR CLAIMS WERE 
BOTH MERITORIOUS AND BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH. 
In seeking to justify the statutory attorney fee award, the Holdens make a raft of 
untrue, unsupported, and/or disputed factual assertions, all of which ignore the principle 
that, at the summary judgment stage, the Aults were entitled to have factual inferences 
resolved in their favor.. Instead, the Holdens proclaim that "[t]he file is replete with bad 
faith by plaintiffs," setting forth seven alleged examples: 
First, the Aults' complaint shows, on its face, that they were without title for the dual 
reasons that the conveyance alleged failed to close and, if it had, was subject to the 
rights of parties in possession, the Holdens. Pursuit of a complaint not even alleging 
title, the basic and first element of any quiet title action is the epitome of lack of 
merit. (Brief of Appellees at 33). 
This bald assertion has several defects. First, it is based upon an argument that 
was never addressed by the trial court, and was instead simply inserted by the Holdens 
into proposed findings and signed by the judge without any indication of the court's 
independent reasoning. Indeed, the court had previously rejected an attempt to have the 
complaint dismissed on these same grounds, denying the Holdens' earlier Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. (R. 208-07, R. 809 at 28-29). The assertion also disregards 
the extensive legal argument and case law adduced by the Aults in support of their 
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position. Whether this Court ultimately agrees with the Auks' arguments is far different 
from suggesting that the arguments are entirely without legal basis. 
Second, the Auks' complaint, together with the answers to discovery, establish the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence in favor of the Holdens. (Brief of Appellee 
at 33). 
This assertion is, of course, the principal issue on appeal. Regardless of how this 
Court rules, several undisputed facts rendered the Aults' lawsuit reasonable, including: 
The Holdens were aware of surveys confirming the actual boundary; the Aults' deed 
encompasses the disputed land, and the Holdens' deed does not; the Holdens 
acknowledged to the Aults at least twice (in 1978 and 1990) that the strip belonged to the 
Aults, and even sought to trade for the strip; and the fence was not erected to demarcate 
the boundary, but rather a livestock lane. Although the Holdens disclaim it in their brief, 
the above assertion is nothing more than a suggestion that sanctions are available merely 
because they prevailed on summary judgment. This Court has rejected such a strict 
liability reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. {See Brief of Appellants at 43-45). 
Third, the file shows that the Aults' [sic] resorted to self-help prior to the filing of 
the complaint and resorted to self-help a second time after the filing of the 
complaint, in disregard of the jurisdiction of the trial court, by going on the property 
and removing and altering the fences. (Brief of Appellees at 33) 
This assertion fails to take into account the factual circumstances surrounding 
these issues. With respect to the removal of part of a fence on the west on November 25, 
1998, it was non-confrontational in nature, and occurred prior of the filing of litigation. 
With respect to the allegation that Mr. Ault attempted to remove another portion of fence 
on December 18, 1998, the findings submitted by the Holdens acknowledged that Mr. 
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Ault denied their version of events, yet essentially rendered a finding of fact in their own 
favor. (R. 510 f^ 34). There was no order in effect at the time, the property was 
reasonably believed to be the Aults', and the Holdens had previously come onto the 
Aults' land and damaged their property. 
The Aults' testimony, which must be assumed true at the summary judgment stage, 
was that the defendants fired a gunshot at the Aults' caretaker, that Mrs. Holden screamed 
at and threatened the caretaker, that the Holdens entered the Aults' property, pulled the 
Aults' large water pump into the middle of Aults' hay field and flattened its tires and 
otherwise disabled the pump, that the Holdens' son in the presence of Mr. Holden 
threatened Mr. Ault, that the Holdens' son, again with the knowledge of the defendants, 
jumped the fence and pounded and jerked on fence posts and shouted a profanity at Mr. 
Ault, and that Mr. Holden violated the court's status quo order by erecting a new fence on 
the property. (R. 172-70, 167-64). 
An award of attorney fees cannot be justified on alleged misconduct by one party 
that is disputed, that has never been ruled upon by a court, and that has occurred with 
equal or greater frequency by the opposing party. This contention lends no support to the 
award. 
Fourth, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order as a result of the Aults 
attempt at self help which direct [sic] them to not go on the property or disturb the 
fences. (Brief of Appellees at 33) 
Citation to this ground to support an attorney fee award borders on disingenuous. 
The Holdens filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on December 22, 1998 -
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after having been informed that the Aults' counsel was out of town until December 28 — 
and obtained Judge Dever's signature ex parte. (R. 45 \ 9, R. 46 \ 11). 
One day after returning, Auks' counsel agreed to a stipulation to retain the terms 
of the temporary order. (R. 67) The trial court never ruled on the merits of the motion, 
and no problems occurred after the stipulation. (R. 809 at 31). This assertion offers no 
support for the fee award. 
Fifth, the Aults disregarded the temporary order by going on the property and 
attempting to construct a new fence, resulting in a motion for an order to show 
cause why the Aults should not be held in contempt. (Memorandum, p. 2). 
Again, the Holdens ignore the fact that Mr. Ault's testimony, assumed true for 
purposes of summary judgment, was to the contrary. It is also inappropriate to cite the 
mere filing of a motion when no court ever ruled on it. (The Holdens acknowledged 
below that the motion was rendered moot by the court's order that the parties not cross 
the fence line pending resolution of the case. (R. 567)). 
Sixth, the Aults conducted abusive discovery for the purpose of running up costs. 
(Brief of Appellees at 33). 
This statement is mystifying. Throughout the entirety of the lawsuit, the Aults 
submitted a single set of 17 interrogatories and a single request for production of 
documents numbering 11 requests. The depositions of all fact witnesses and parties 
(including that of Mr. Ault taken by the Holdens) were completed in a total of one and a 
half days. (R. 216, 285). 
4
 Pursuant to local rules, the Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
themselves are not in the record, but appellants do not believe the Holdens will dispute 
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To suggest that the Aults conducted "abusive" discovery is incomprehensible. 
Moreover, the correct approach for addressing such a claim would have been through 
U.R.Civ.P. 37, or by seeking a protective order under U.R.Civ.P. 26. See, e.g., U.R.Civ.P. 
11 (rule "do[es] not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37"). 
Seventh, before the filing of the suit, Mr. Ault told Mr. Holden that he (Holden) could 
not afford to fight a quiet title action. (Brief of Appellees at 33, citing R. 566). 
This averment is simply false. The Holdens offer no citation for it (R. 566 is an 
earlier memorandum containing the same statement, again without citation), and the 
omission is understandable, because it was actually Mr. Holden who said he would not have 
to incur any legal fees if a suit were filed. It was also Mr. Holden who insisted that Mr. 
Ault "make the first move". Conversely, as demonstrated by a telephone conversation 
taped by Mr. Holden, it was Mr. Ault who reminded Mr. Holden that the Holdens had 
originally requested to trade another piece of their property for the disputed strip, Mr. Ault 
who suggested a reasonable compromise (a 50-50 division of the land at issue), and Mr. 
Ault who repeatedly said he would prefer to find a mutually agreeable solution to avoid 
litigation: 
LA [hereinafter Ault]: Okay. On the line down here first thing. What do you want 
to do about this. At one time you were going to trade me. 
DH [hereinafter Holden]: Well, I talked to my attorney and he said to go ahead and 
let you make the first move. 
their content. 
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Ault: Okay. I'll file suit against you Darrell. That's going to cost us both about 
$15,000 - if you want to do that. 
Holden: It ain't going to cost me nothing because I've already been to Legal Aid 
and they'll represent me for good. 
Ault: Well good. That's okay. That's fine. I'm just calling to see if you want to 
work something out. If you don't then I'm going to -
[Mr. Holden interrupts to begin discussion about pipe dispute.] 
* * * 
Ault: Okay. If you don't want to work with me here on this fine. I'll just do what I 
have to do. 
Holden: Maybe you ought to go down and talk to my attorney. 
Ault: (inaudible) - talk to your attorney. ( ) friends to you, I mean I don't 
want to do that, but if you want me to that's what I'll do. 
(R. 586, 584). 
Mr. Ault suggested that each party compromise by accepting half of the disputed 30-
foot strip. That solution would allow Mr. Holden to retain the shed he had built on the 
property, and Mr. Ault agreed that he would deed over the half: 
Ault: If you don't want to do that, then I'll just have to do what I have to do. I don't 
want to do that. 
Holden: Why do you want a lane here? 
Ault: Because I cannot take anything heavy down this ( ) part. (Inaudible). 
Holden: Well, how about if I ponder on this a little bit and think about it. 
Ault: That's fine. You go talk to your attorney and do whatever you want to do 
Darrell. (Inaudible) I'll just split the difference with you. We'll go down 15 feet. 
I'll miss your barn. The barn's over there 12 feet, then I go 12 feet ( ) or 
whatever it is. I don't want your bam, and I wouldn't want anybody to take my bam. 
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* * * 
Ault: (Inaudible) Just talk it over - I don't know how I could be more fair. If I go 
the other way it'll just mean money to me I guess. It's just an income tax deduction 
anyway. But I would try to get along. I don't want to take your barn. Even if I went 
the other way I wouldn't take your barn. 
Holden: Well, let me go and talk to the wife and by Monday we can probably have a 
decision and then we can get with you. All right. By Monday we'll have some kind 
of an understanding. But you did say that if we go ahead and do this thing, you will 
put the fence in— 
Ault: I will. 
Holden: And you will go ahead and get the deeds amended to what we agree on. 
Ault: I will. 
(R.574, 570-69; emphasis added.) 
The Holdens' implication that the Aults filed suit as some sort of economic extortion 
is completely baseless. The record supports a finding of neither lack of merit nor bad faith 
by the Aults, and the statutory fee award should be reversed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COSTS, 
A. The memorandum was untimely. 
There is no dispute that judgment was entered in this case on July 18, 2000, and 
that the memorandum of costs was not filed until August 1, 2000, beyond the period 
allowed under U.R.Civ.P. 5. 
The only excuse offered by the Holdens is that the court clerk sent the judge's 
ruling to the Holden's former counsel, who did not forward it to the Holdens until there 
was little time left to meet the 5-day requirement. The Holdens do not suggest that they 
ever checked with the court themselves (unlike the parties in Board of Commissioners v. 
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Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997)), even though they knew that their attorney had 
withdrawn and that the proposed judgment had been submitted to the court for signature 
on June 26, 2000. (R. 493-92, copied to the Holdens).5 (Ironically, the Holdens complain 
that the clerk sent the conformed judgment to Mr. Nielsen, yet a pre-addressed envelope 
with Mr. Nielsen's name on it had been submitted to the clerk for that very purpose.) (R. 
491). 
The clerk mailed out the ruling the same day the judgment was entered, July 18, 
2000. Assuming a three-day mailing period, Mr. Nielsen received the notice in ample 
time to contact the Holdens before the Rule 5 deadline (July 26) passed. Instead, he 
chose to mail the ruling out to the Holdens on July 25. That decision, and that of the 
Holdens not to check with the court themselves, are not the Aults' responsibility. The 
memorandum of costs was untimely, and it should have been rejected. 
B. The memorandum did not establish reasonableness or necessity. 
To recover costs, a claimant must not only identify costs, but establish their 
reasonableness and necessity. The Holdens claim that a general averment is sufficient, 
but this Court has required more than mere quotation of the rule. Peterson, 937 P.2d at 
5
 The Aults' counsel had sent the Holdens a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel long 
before the court ruled. (R. 503). Mr. Nielsen also appeared to continue providing legal 
advice to the Holdens. In his letter of July 25, 2000, for example, he enclosed a proposed 
Notice of Judgment form for the Holdens to file. Although Mr. Nielsen told the Holdens 
in that letter that they were entitled to claim costs, he did not inform them that their 
deadline was the following day, instead advising them. "You should have your new 
attorney, whoever that may be, take care of that matter." (R. 550). 
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1272; Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). The Holdens' memorandum made 
no such effort, and was legally insufficient on its face. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellants Leo and Virginia Ault respectfully 
request that the order granting summary judgment be reversed and that the case be 
remanded. Appellants request that the trial court be directed to enter judgment for the 
Aults on their First Cause of Action (Quiet Title), and to allow the Aults to proceed to 
trial on their other causes of action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fe^ day of March, 2001. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
William J. Hansen 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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